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After centuries of absence, sortition is making its return through 
academic research, practical experiments, and activists’ calls for 
linking participation and deliberation.1 These invocations of 
sortition, however, offer divergent accounts of the concept and 
different justifi cations.2 Gastil and Wright’s proposal for a 
“sortition chamber” provides one such example, but sortition 
can be conceptualized more broadly.3 When properly analyzed 
in this larger sense, one can better appreciate how sortition 
satisfi es democratic principles—often in novel ways that go 
beyond those enumerated in the lead chapter of this volume.
To better understand the implications of sortition, I begin by 
contrasting it with the other modes of selection democracies use 
to place people in positions of power, including not only elec-
tions but also nomination and certifi cation. I then distinguish 
varieties of sortition that differ by their mandate, the population 
from which a random sample is drawn, and the degree to which 
service is voluntary or compulsory. Depending on the design 
considerations such as these, sortition can provide a novel means 
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of realizing the democratic aspirations of equality, impartiality, 
representativeness, and legitimacy.4
Modes of Selection
When a good, task, or position are wanted by too many people, 
or undesired but necessary to the collective, a selection process 
is needed. Aside from in small direct democracies, certain 
missions—particularly deliberative ones—cannot be carried out 
by all the citizens and need to be accomplished, instead, by 
representatives. I identify four modes of selection, any of which 
can be combined with the others.5 In doing so, I focus on the 
disadvantages of the mode of selection other than sortition.
Election
The “triumph of election” as the legitimate way of selecting 
rulers makes us forget that prior to the American and French 
revolutions, it was common to hold a contrary view, as expressed 
by Montesquieu: “The suffrage by lot is the nature of democ-
racy. Suffrage by choice is the nature of aristocracy. Drawing 
lots  . . . leaves each citizen a reasonable hope of serving his 
country.”6 In Athenian democracy, most public offi ces were 
appointed randomly, ensuring the equality of each citizen and 
refusing to elect the “better” (aristoi), except for few specifi c 
tasks. By contrast, Sparta mainly used election and was consid-
ered to be an oligarchy.7
Manin shows that despite this knowledge, the American 
founding fathers and the French revolutionaries disliked democ-
racy. They chose election for selecting representatives to create 
an elected aristocracy, socially distinct from the people.8 Later 
the word democracy was used as an advertising tool by politi-
cians to lure electors. Eventually, modern political regimes 
changed their names to “representative democracies.”9
Election is a selection procedure that vertically ascends from 
the bottom to the top. A majority or plurality of electors choose 
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every few years to which preselected candidate it will surrender 
power. In terms of the democratic criteria discussed more fully 
later in this chapter, elections have four limitations. First, they 
fail to provide descriptive representation (that is, a body of 
representatives demographically similar to the electorate). 
Second, they produce only a kind of personal legitimacy. Third, 
they cannot ensure competent and impartial governance. And 
fi nally, elections cannot function among true equals because 
they require voters to distinguish between candidates; choosing 
one person over another would be diffi cult—if not impossible—
when none are considered superior.
Nomination
Nomination is a common selection method in representative 
governments. In France, for example, the prime minister is 
nominated by the president, who is elected through direct 
universal suffrage. The prime minister then nominates govern-
ment ministers, and the president has to give his approval. 
Nowhere are federal government cabinet ministers or agency 
heads elected.
Nomination has signifi cant problems. The nomination process 
can be accused of being partial, biased, and arbitrary. Like elec-
tions, it fails to provide descriptive representation. A nominee’s 
legitimacy vertically descends from the top of the political hier-
archy, which can create hostility among the lay public at that 
system’s base. Finally, since nomination gives an offi ce to a 
specifi c person, it produces a very individual type of legitimacy.
Certifi cation
Certifi cation is a mainstream selection process (for universities, 
civil servants, and so on), but because it is seen as technocratic, 
it is almost never used to produce political representatives in 
democratic systems. Exceptions do exist, however. Persons wish-
ing to be nominated to judgeships in the United States, for 
instance, commonly receive ratings from the American Bar 
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Association regarding their qualifi cations, with an “unquali-
fi ed” score sometimes jeopardizing a nominee.10 Those who 
wish to be eligible for random selection onto the C alifornia 
Citizens Redistricting Commission must fi rst meet a set of quali-
fi cations set out by the state auditor.11
Certifi cation has its own problems. Those certifi ed to serve 
have not been authorized by the public, nor even necessarily by 
elected offi cials. It is grounded in a distinction principle, so 
certifi ed representatives, by defi nition, do not resemble the 
represented. Certifi cation creates a type of legitimacy that is 
both individual and based on superiority. Even though certifi -
cation seems to guarantee some equality of opportunity between 
candidates, producing a form of horizontal legitimacy, this 
impartiality is often illusory. In reality, certifi cation tests are 
defi ned and conducted by superiors who may not themselves
be accountable to anyone for the certifi cation process. If the 
decision-makers atop the hierarchy do not directly choose their 
favored candidates, they create a test where those same candi-
dates are more likely to succeed. Therefore, the legitimacy 
remains vertical.
Sortition
Sortition means selecting representatives by lot, but the follow-
ing section will clarify important variations of this general 
concept. Concerns about sortition abound, as evidenced by 
many of the other chapters in this volume. Here, I focus on one 
particular drawback—the hazard that a sortition body would 
produce incompetent offi cials. Jacques Rancière noted a fi rst 
defense against this charge: “the drawing of lots has never 
favoured the incompetent over the competent.”12 Sortition is not 
a competence fi lter, but the other selection modes all share this 
problem. Only certifi cation can pretend to ensure competence, 
on the condition that its test criteria are “sound”—though in 
whose judgment?13
Moreover, the majority of deliberative-democracy experi-
ments, such as deliberative polls and citizens’ juries, 
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demonstrate that citizens learn fast and become more compe-
tent than elected offi cials on complex issues.14 Finally, due to the 
“cognitive diversity” it provides, random selection can be an 
“epistemically superior mode of selection of representatives.” 
Hélène Landemore explains that “decisions taken by the many 
are more likely to be right than decisions taken by the few.” 
Indeed, sortition produces an assembly with a greater diversity 
of experiences and social profi les, which creates a stronger 
collective intelligence capable of tackling issues elected legisla-
tures fail to address adequately.15
Selection and Deliberation Frameworks in Sortition
Which kind of offi cials do we want? If we want representatives 
who look like the represented, we shall choose sortition, for the 
democratic ideal of “government by the people.” If we prefer 
socially distinct elites (an aristocratic view), we shall choose 
election. If we think that leaders should choose the representa-
tives (an oligarchic perspective), we shall adopt nomination. If 
we want qualifi ed representatives (leaning toward technocracy), 
we shall select through certifi cation. Even if one chooses sorti-
tion over the alternative methods of selection, there remain 
many choices about how to create and organize a sortition 
body.16 Gastil and Wright’s sortition chamber presents one set of 
choices, but other sortition designs will refl ect different deci-
sions about mandates, target populations, and voluntary versus 
compulsory service.
Mandate and Duration
Regardless of the mode of selection, the deliberative rules and 
institutional architecture in which an assembly is embedded are 
crucial. This is especially the case for a sortition assembly, with 
the shifts from consultative minipublics to a powerful body 
granted legislative authority.17 Most sortition theorists and 
advocates envision assemblies that are deliberative but not 
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executive. These main missions, none of which are mutually 
exclusive, include the following:
1. Consultation of the population, as in a deliberative poll.18
2. Providing information to offi cials and citizens, through writ-
ing a statement.19
3. Control and evaluation of offi cials and policies.20
4. Making a policy or budgetary decision, as in some citizens’ 
juries or participatory budgeting.21
5. Legislation, with an additional chamber of the parliament, as 
in Gastil and Wright’s proposal.
6. Constitution, both for revising one or writing a new one.22
7. Long-term issues, such as climate change or techno-scientifi c 
risks.23
Regardless of its mandate, so far, every political system based 
on sortition has had short mandates and regular rotation of 
members.24 By contrast, election favors reelection, certifi cation 
is easily sustained once met, and nomination maintains small 
circles of initiates. Unlike consultative minipublics, a more 
enduring sortition chamber would constitute a bold deviation 
from precedent, which might be necessary for a full-functioning 
legislature.
Population
Regardless of the mode of selection, there is always a delimita-
tion of the “relevant political body” and criteria to be part of the 
selection process. As in the case of elections, the lottery for sorti-
tion draws from the citizens of a given political unit, but the 
pool can sometimes be more inclusive. Some processes have 
drawn names from a phone book, which includes individuals 
not registered to vote—or not even eligible to do so. The Belgian 
G1000 reserved 10 percent of its seats for homeless people and 
undocumented immigrants. The pool is usually related to the 
level where the decision is implemented (such as workplace, 
local neighborhood, state).
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Mixed Selection
The different modes of selection are not opposed, but instead 
complementary and combinable. In the French military, for 
example, members of the High Council of Military Function 
(Conseil Supérieur de la Fonction Militaire, CSFM) pass certifi -
cation for their rank, then are sorted and elected by the other 
randomly designated soldiers.25 The pairing of certifi cation and 
sortition is also used in the California Citizens Redistricting 
Commission.26
To show the fl exibility of the selection mix and stimulate 
democratic imagination, I propose that political parties could 
present manifestos and a long unranked list of candidates. 
Citizens could then vote on the manifestos, and the result would 
determine the proportion of representatives randomly selected 
from each party. This would avoid discussing candidates’ 
charisma or personal life to focus on manifestos and concrete 
policy propositions.
Voluntary, Consensual, or Compulsory Service
When it comes to serving on a sortition body, there are different 
degrees to which doing so might be obligatory. Here, I distin-
guish three levels: voluntary, consensual, and compulsory.27
At the fi rst level, sortition representatives are selected from a 
pool of volunteers, which means they actively desired to be 
selected. This method has the advantage of bringing motivated 
people, but the disadvantage of letting power in the hands of 
those who wanted it—“the worst of all evils,” according to 
Plato or Ranci ère.28 However, volunteering to take part in sorti-
tion was the functioning mode in Athens, Venice, Florence, and 
Aragon.29
An alternative carries out the lottery among the whole rele-
vant political body, without any call for volunteers. In this case, 
the persons selected have a right to refuse the public offi ce a 
posteriori. The vast majority of deliberative-democracy experi-
ments function on this consensual model. To encourage 
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acceptance of the invitation, organizers typically provide incen-
tives for service, as do Gastil and Wright in their proposed sorti-
tion chamber. This approach fares better in terms of equality 
and of representativeness. By letting invitees decide whether to 
serve, even with strong incentives to do so, the resulting body 
differs from the larger population it aims to represent. Some 
demographic groups might be missing (or at least underrepre-
sented) because their randomly selected members did not 
consider themselves as equal with the other selectees—not 
worthy of a seat in the sortition body. The same pattern appears 
for elections, in which underprivileged social classes vote less 
frequently than others.30 The underrepresentation of disadvan-
taged social groups goes against principles of moral justice and 
inclusion, but it also poses a legitimacy problem: those second-
class citizens who felt excluded might stop respecting laws they 
had no hand in creating.
One solution to this problem would be moving away from 
voluntary and consensual levels by making public service 
compulsory for those chosen through sortition. It might seem 
strange to regard participation as a duty; however, it is the secu-
lar practice of popular jury in France, the United States, British 
Commonwealth countries, and many others. Many countries, 
notably including Australia, make voting compulsory, and no 
country excuses its citizens from paying taxes. There are other 
advantages to this third approach. Obligatory sortition improves 
the impartiality of those chosen. It would be suspicious to elect 
a jury from volunteer candidates; one would wonder what inter-
ests they serve. A compulsory system also protects against the 
“free rider” phenomenon. Taking part in a deliberative assem-
bly or jury is a heavy load in time and energy; a compulsory 
system spreads that burden as widely as possible.31 Finally, obli-
gation would push into service those who might otherwise 
perceive themselves as unworthy—thereby empowering the 
most disenfranchised segment of society.
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How Sortition Meets Democratic Principles
Having distinguished sortition from other modes of selection, 
and with an appreciation for the different ways one can imple-
ment it, I turn now to how sortition expresses democratic values. 
Historical analysis reveals three successive principles for sorti-
tion: the random selection of citizens for public offi ces in ancient 
Athens, based on the principle of equality; the lottery to pick out 
members of popular jury, aiming for impartiality; and opinion 
polls giving a representativeness of the population through repre-
sentative sample. Some authors in this volume address the issue 
of democratic values, but they overlook some of the novel ways 
sortition relates to equality, impartiality, representativeness—and 
the legitimacy this relationship produces.32 Depending on its 
institutional architecture, sortition’s democratic principles can be 
enhanced or diminished, but here I stress its greatest democratic 
potential compared to other modes of selection.
Equality
Without volunteering or quotas, sortition gives excellent statis-
tical equality between individuals. Each citizen has the same 
chance to be randomly selected. For Cornel ius Castoriadis, this 
principle is the same as universal suffrage and majority rule. 
Each citizen is considered equally politically competent; there-
fore, each voice is considered equal to others.33 “The scandal of 
democracy, and of the drawing of lots that is its essence, is to 
reveal that [the title to govern] can be nothing but the absence 
of title.” As Jacques Rancière says, the power of the people is 
“the equality of capabilities to occupy the positions of gover-
nors and of the governed.”34
An answer to skeptics of this equality of capabilities is the 
evidence showing that citizens come to good decisions, if given 
the chance, as has been shown in so many deliberative-
democracy experiments. Compared with the average voter, 
addled by political infotainment, a participant in a random 
assembly is demonstrably more competent.35
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The second type of equality produced by sortition is the delib-
erative equality among the representatives. Once selected, all the 
representatives in a sortition body become equals. Lottery 
suppresses the affi rmation of superiority, which in other selec-
tion modes might be expressed as, “I’ve won the election with a 
bigger majority”; “I was the fi rst nominated by the authorities”; 
or “I’ve passed the test with better grades.” All representatives 
drawn by lots have the exact same position, instead of being in 
the majority or the opposition. Each voice should be heard with 
the same attention, leading to a more equal footing for 
deliberation.
Finally, sortition can create an inclusive equality between 
representatives and represented. Indeed, the represented can say 
to their representatives, “Only chance distinguishes us, so we 
remain equals.” As Gil Delannoi puts it, this “inclusion effect is 
not just coming from the fact that people elected by lots have an 
equal chance, but also from the fact that everyone knows that 
he or she can or could be selected.”36
I expect that this affi rmation of the equal political compe-
tence of all citizens could lead to another kind of inclusive 
equality—through greater mass participation in politics. Under 
sortition, it is no longer possible to say to citizens, “Your partici-
pation is your vote; give your power to the elected and be quiet 
while they work.” Historical and recent cases show that with 
sortition the necessary moment of mass participation is not 
suppressed but moved from election toward the debates and 
votes on laws through referendum. Deliberative experiments are 
often linked with participatory and direct-democracy proce-
dures, such as public debates,  e-participation, or referenda, as 
was the case with every citizens’ assembly, whether in Canada, 
Iceland, Belgium, or Ireland. These tools allow citizens to use 
their power directly instead of delegating it.37 Moreover, as 
sortition would give a representative sample, possibly adjusted 
with quotas, excluded minorities would have a fair share in 
seats, creating a feeling of inclusion that further emboldens their 
participation.
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Impartiality
Impartiality appears as the most obvious quality of sortition, as 
expressed in the neutrality principle. This is probably why the 
oldest use of random selection still exists through the popular 
jury, which judges admonish to remain impartial in their 
deliberations.
Neutrality is also the main principle justifying sortition for 
consensus conferences, particularly on techno-scientifi c issues in 
cases like the  Danish Board of Technology.38 There is a tension 
between interests such as public health or economic benefi ts, and 
it is necessary to ask the impartial opinion of lay citizens who 
have heard opposing experts. To consult only experts, activists, 
or industrialists would raise doubts about process neutrality. 
Suspicion can arise from the simple fact that an individual steps 
forward as a candidate (or receives a nomination) to participate. 
By contrast, a lottery increases the likelihood that people engag-
ing in the deliberation have no hidden agenda and may, instead, 
seek the common good. Sortition also prevents cronyism and 
backdoor negotiations between small powerful groups, as there 
is no party line or campaign funding to negotiate.39
A lottery makes manipulation through media and advertising 
to win elections pointless. Nonetheless, parties and media still 
play an important role on how an issue is debated in the public 
sphere, especially in situations where a referendum follows the 
assembly deliberation. Random selection also increases neutral-
ity by limiting bribery and the legal “buying” of representation 
through campaign contributions. The process of sortition is 
transparent, whether it is conducted physically or digitally by 
source code that anyone can check,40 contrary to some elections 
with “forgotten” ballots or vote miscalculation. Chance 
suppresses favoritism and discriminations, though the risk of 
corruption may exist for bodies that have broad agendas and 
long-term offi ces, as in Gastil and Wright’s proposal. Even so, 
sortition should mitigate the tendency toward corruption 
evidenced in the elected, nominated, and certifi ed bodies that 
exist today.
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A second kind of impartiality I call unity—or the discourage-
ment of destructive forms of confl ict. Sortition may make compe-
tition or partisan strategy pointless. For this “peace producing 
virtue of exteriority,” as Bernard Manin calls it, lots were used in 
Italian republics to avoid “the violent tearing created by the open 
electoral competition.”41 Sortition avoids electoral campaigns, 
demagoguery, and factions, though it cannot guarantee that 
those do not form after the fact—especially if paired with an 
elected body, as Gastil and Wright envision.
Political parties are criticized for the division they create, as 
they are “combat organizations specially built to carry out a 
sublimated form of civil war [political campaign],” according to 
Pierre Bourdieu.42 This fear of faction and division is a main 
reason why the French Parliament chose sortition for the CSFM 
in 1968. There is a need for a concertation process within the 
army to gather the views and approvals of the soldiers regarding 
reforms affecting their wages, work conditions, pensions, and so 
on. Nevertheless, the permanent imperative of ensuring the 
defense of the nation cannot allow electoral competition within 
the army. If all the voices—especially from lower ranks—must 
be heard in the  concertation process, the selection of the repre-
sentatives should provide diversity in the assembly but could 
not endanger the army’s unity.43 This unity is also desirable for 
broad public constituencies, as sortition prevents candidates 
from targeting a big part of the electorate while leaving behind 
or stigmatizing another part.
Among representatives and the larger publics they represent, 
debates are important. Unity here is not the absence of divi-
sions, but the absence of longstanding—sometimes artifi cial—
preestablished partisan cleavages that impede honest debate. 
New divisions and debates should rise from concrete issues, but 
they should do so based on empirical and normative disagree-
ments that relate to laws, budgets, and other legislative tasks, 
rather than the public-relations imperatives of parties. The 
absence of party discipline allows randomly selected representa-
tives to seek a common good, instead of pursuing factional 
interests.
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Finally, sortition creates a special kind of impartiality, which 
I refer to as unpredictability. The professionalization of politics 
leads to a trend of politicians who all look alike, sometimes even 
across parties as well as within them. As Pierre Bourdieu argues, 
elected offi cials follow the rules and codes of their closed circles 
and become predictable:
The sense of the political game that allows politicians to predict 
other politicians’ positions is also what makes them predictable. 
Predictable, which means responsible, competent, serious, relia-
ble; ready to play the game with constancy without surprise or 
treasons of the role imposed to them by the game’s structure.44
According to the historian Alexandros Kontos, the ancient 
Athenian economic policy was predictable because the magis-
trates were not. By contrast, contemporary elections make poli-
ticians’ strategies predictable, which allows the economic sphere 
to be volatile and uncertain. Kontos’s point is that since sorti-
tion made it impossible for a specifi c class to stay in power, it 
allowed an unpredictable, frequently renewed assembly of poor 
people (the majority) to rule. The “free market” was tamed and 
speculation banned.45 Unpredictability operates here in the same 
way people might operate behind philosopher John Rawls’s 
“veil of ignorance.” Selection by lottery prevents participants 
from knowing the positions of the others on the issue, their rela-
tive rhetorical skills, or their openness to changing their minds. 
Indeed, some minipublics have produced surprising results, as 
with Texas residents championing renewable energy or Irish 
citizens calling for marriage equality.46
Representativeness
The recent hegemony of elections gives the illusion of represen-
tation through authorization as the only legitimate method of 
democratic selection, but sortition provides an alternative. 
Through the law of large numbers, sortition enacts the old ideal 
of mirror representation since a representative sample provides 
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a fair cross section of the population, in terms of social classes, 
ages, gender, and more.47 Lottery also gives seats to ordinary 
citizens. Therefore, sorted representatives would have similar 
background to the population they represent. Gastil and Wright, 
along with other authors in this volume, have noted this, but 
they have overlooked subtle ways that sortition satisfi es the 
principle of representativeness, by way of diversity and 
proximity.
“Parliament should be as a map for a territory, a miniature 
portrait of the People,” said (in substance) John Adams, 
Mirabeau, and American anti-Federalists. Apart from mere 
geographical diversity, however, modern elections produce 
assemblies that do not capture the population’s diversity. In 
France in 2013, for example, blue- and white-collar laborers 
were half of the workforce but were only 3 percent of MPs 
(with the majority of MPs being lawyers or senior offi cials). 
This lack of diversity goes against the ancient  quod omnes 
tangit principles, meaning that everyone should discuss an 
issue concerning everyone. As rephrased by Dewey, “The man 
who wears the shoe knows best that it pinches and where it 
pinches.”48 As in the epistemic argument, the diversity of a 
representative assembly is also a question of effi cacy.49
By including the full diversity of a public, sortition better 
represents it in a collective sense. Even when the size of a sorti-
tion body is too small to have a statistically representative 
sample of individuals, such as in a jury, the lottery aims to get 
the greatest diversity possible. Some deliberative experiments 
even make extra efforts to include marginalized people or 
minorities, like indigenous peoples in Canada.50
The so-called party diversity in modern democracies is actu-
ally weak, especially in two-party systems. Many people’s 
concerns are not represented, and parties seem to be in decline. 
Moreover, through sortition, representativeness is necessarily 
collective: the whole assembly should represent the population 
as a coherent whole, not each member individually (and not just 
society’s separate factions). Whereas an elected offi cial may feel 
“personally representative” of a constituency because a 
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majority of voters granted authorization through an election, 
sortition members have more latitude to represent the collective 
because they were chosen from the full population.51
Offi cials chosen through sortition also represent the popula-
tion better by virtue of their enduring proximity to the public. 
Distance between sortition representatives and represented 
might grow  ex post, but offi cials chosen by lot serve short terms, 
with regular rotation.52 Sortition is consistent with the view that 
politics is an amateur job that should not be professionalized.53 
To look again at the example of representation within the French 
military, that system values experiential proximity. As one 
soldier holding offi ce by lot explained in an interview I 
conducted, “We live the same conditions as the colleagues we 
represent.”54
Elected and appointed offi cials split away easily from constit-
uents with whom they do not share everyday life experiences, 
but they also do so due to the “iron law of oligarchy.” Politicians 
and unionists who work together become colleagues, creating a 
connivance climate that leads to citizens’ defi ance. Proudhon 
gives testimony: “One needs to have lived in this ballot booth 
that we call National Assembly to realize to what extent men 
completely ignoring the state of the country are almost always 
the ones representing it.”55 Democratic proximity should be 
sharing the same life as the represented, not the false “proxim-
ity” displayed by politicians during their hand shaking. A single 
four-year term in the sortition chamber seems brief enough to 
maintain proximity, unlike a political career.
Legitimacy
A process that meets the principles of equality, impartiality, 
and representativeness should gain some measure of demo-
cratic legitimacy. Legitimacy is crucial because it underwrites 
consent—the willingness of the demos to accept decisions 
without the use of force. There are three elements composing 
this specifi c type of legitimacy: impersonality, independence, 
and humility (or nonsuperiority), which are connected to the 
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three democratic principles—equality, impartiality, and repre-
sentativeness—previously analyzed.56
First, impersonality comes from the character of representa-
tiveness within a sortition assembly. The assembly is “imper-
sonal” because it can be representative only as a whole; no 
single member can claim to be “representative” on their own. 
Representatives selected by lot should gain public legitimacy 
because they have similarity and proximity to the people they 
represent. Sortition can generate a diverse and representative 
sample, without using quotas if the sample is big enough. 
Sortition was (and still is) linked to proximity, thanks to brief 
terms and rotation, contrary to communist offi cials that 
started their lives as factory workers but then never returned 
to their roots. There are also cases of proximity without simi-
larity, like the young educated Maoist students going to farms 
and factories, sharing the living conditions of the working 
class, without coming from poor peasant backgrounds. The 
combination of both similarity and proximity produced by 
sortition, creating representativeness, enhances support and 
the quality of citizens’ lives. Anyone represented by a sortition 
body can say, “Some members of that body look like me and 
share my living conditions.” This also prevents the risk of 
charismatic leaders. Moreover, members resembling the repre-
sented come to offi ce as unknowns, rather than as a candidate 
who built a personal brand. In this sense, members gain legiti-
macy by virtue of being (formerly) anonymous members of 
the demos.
Second, sortition’s legitimacy differs from other selection 
modes because of the “direction” from which it comes. Contrary 
to a nomination, it comes not from the top, and unlike elections, 
it does not require climbing up from the bottom. Instead, 
members of a sortition body gain power and legitimacy hori-
zontally: citizens remain lay citizens, even as sortition confers a 
temporary title on them.57 In this way, sortition gains legitimacy 
by producing independent representatives who do not owe their 
title to anyone. This is a good solution for the concertation 
process in the French military, as neither the minister nor the 
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soldiers would accept the authority of an assembly selected by 
the other.58 Sortition is the only selection procedure that is 
impartial, neutral, and horizontal. Sortition representatives do 
not have to fl atter an electorate, special interests, or a party hier-
archy to get reelected. They are not submissive to those who 
nominated them. They do not have to follow rules set up by 
experts designing the test for certifi cation. Independence from 
such constraints makes them, potentially, more legitimate in the 
public’s eye.
Finally, the sortition body’s members might retain a kind of 
humility that distinguishes them from offi cials selected through 
other means. A conventional representative has a feeling of 
personal superiority over all those who failed—or did not even 
try—to pass the selection contest in which he or she prevailed. 
That sense might come from having won an election, being a 
nominee chosen by elites, or being certifi ed as a technocrat after 
passing prestigious tests. This is a reason why elected represent-
atives so often fail to keep their promises or listen to popular 
protest; they believe themselves superior to “the people.” By 
contrast, sortition is insulated from the aristocratic “distinction 
principle” linked to election,59 nomination, or certifi cation. 
Delannoi explains this crucial psychological dimension in these 
terms:
“Sortition offends no one,” noted Montesquieu. It doesn’t create 
vanity for the winner nor rancour for the loser. It diminishes 
arrogance and bitterness  . . . This soothing effect is individual, 
collective and systemic. There are almost no exceptions to it. 
Maybe a lottery winner can consider himself as “loved by the 
Gods” but such a favor is at least special and never owned with 
certitude. One cannot compare it to the feeling of one’s own 
merit.60
Sortition produces a legitimacy based on humility. The 
randomly selected representatives do not consider themselves 
better or worse than other candidates or the majority of people 
that did not even try to be selected, because there is no credit to 
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being designated by chance. One is not selected because one 
would be superior to the group, but because one is an equal part 
of the group. Thus the sortition representative can claim, “I have 
the right to speak for you, because nothing distinguishes me 
from you.” Constituents accept this representative claim because 
they can tell themselves, “It could have been me selected for that 
job.” Or, “It might be me next.” Even without parties, elections 
always create a distinction. Voters can think of an elected repre-
sentative coming from the same background and displaying 
proximity. A voter might say, “My representative looks like me 
and shares the reality of my everyday life. But they are different 
because they won an election, which is something I cannot do, 
since I do not possess the qualities to be elected.” The same logic 
applies to nomination and certifi cation.
By contrast, the only difference between the mass public and 
the people selected by sortition is that the sortition representa-
tives must get to work deliberating in citizens’ assemblies or 
juries. Training and experience deliberating may come to set 
these representatives apart, in terms of their legislative expertise, 
but that same career lies within everybody’s reach. If we have to 
select a deliberative assembly, it is not to create an elite, but 
because deliberation cannot be undertaken by millions of people 
simultaneously. This means that citizens would be more likely to 
participate as the system considers them all politically 
competent.
The message sent by sortition is that anyone is assumed to 
have the ability to directly take part in deliberation. This message 
is even stronger when sortition is coupled with direct democ-
racy, as happens in an important share of minipublics. This 
might lead to a “Pygmalion effect”—a self-fulfi lling prophecy in 
which people who are told they are competent become more 
competent.61 By contrast, the logic of delegation and election 
might have the opposite effect, a “Golem effect”62—that is, 
when people are told they cannot directly take part in delibera-
tion but must delegate their power to better actors, they might 
become less motivated to care about politics. Sortition could 
reverse that trend and make its legislators’ humility even more 
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warranted, as the public starts to hold itself to a higher civic 
standard.
A lottery can be used to distribute desired offi ces, like in 
Italian republics, but also to assign duties necessary to the group 
that no one wants to do. In this perspective, holding a public 
offi ce is nothing one should be proud of. Also, citizens might 
accept the sortition assembly’s decisions because they want to 
be accepted in return when they will be sorted and seated. The 
last part of the legitimacy based on humility is the “authority of 
the ordinary.” This is revealed by trust in “real people’s popular 
wisdom” or “common sense.” In such cases, the ordinary person 
receives the confi dence and the support of the group.63
Conclusion
To sharpen our appreciation of sortition, I have distinguished it 
from other modes of selection, clarifi ed the variety of frame-
works it could operate within, and revealed less obvious ways in 
which sortition can thereby fulfi ll democratic principles. Those 
democratic principles, revealing what I call the new spirit of 
sortition, are potentialities not always present but enhanced or 
suppressed by the framework. Sortition is no magical solution 
to the problems of modern democracies, but taking this idea 
seriously gives us the opportunity to imagine democracy beyond 
elections. Envisioning a sortition body helps us see the contra-
dictions between what passes for democracy and real demo-
cratic principles.
Explorations of sortition can also shift the debate from direct 
versus representative democracy to the question of the repre-
sentative’s selection process. Gastil and Wright’s proposal for a 
sortition chamber and, more broadly, the “real utopian” notion 
of random selection could reopen the democratic imagination 
and spark experiments that yield more inclusive forms of repre-
sentation, deliberation, and participation.
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